What is OPEC+?
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, universally known as OPEC+, stands as the single most powerful energy coalition the world has ever seen. Formed in late 2016 when the original OPEC bloc joined hands with 10 non-member oil-producing nations — most notably Russia — the alliance was born out of a crisis. U.S. shale oil output had flooded global markets and sent crude prices into a brutal multi-year collapse, forcing rival producers to either cooperate or watch their revenues bleed out. The result was a landmark Declaration of Cooperation that brought together countries accounting for roughly half of global crude oil supply under a single, coordinated production management framework. Today, OPEC+ is not merely a trade cartel — it is a geopolitical instrument, an economic shock absorber, and the defining institution of the global petroleum era.
Understanding OPEC+ in 2026 means grappling with a group in transition. The UAE announced its withdrawal from OPEC effective May 1, 2026, a seismic development that analysts have called a potential “beginning of the end” for the organization as it has been known. Before that, Angola exited in 2024 over quota disputes, and the ghost of earlier departures — Ecuador, Indonesia, Qatar — lingers over every ministerial meeting. Yet the coalition still commands an official 2026 group-wide production quota of 39.725 million barrels per day (mb/d) per the Declaration of Cooperation, still sets the tempo for global oil prices, and still forces every energy minister, hedge fund trader, and airline finance department on earth to watch its decisions with acute attention. The numbers, the facts, and the data behind OPEC+ in 2026 tell a story that no serious energy reader can afford to miss.
Interesting Facts About OPEC+ 2026
| Fact | Data Point |
|---|---|
| Year OPEC+ was formed | 2016 |
| Total OPEC+ official 2026 production quota | 39.725 million b/d |
| Actual estimated OPEC+ production (accounting for voluntary cuts) | ~38.1 million b/d |
| OPEC+ share of global crude oil production (2024 baseline) | ~47% |
| Total outstanding production cuts still in place (as of late 2025) | ~3.24 million b/d |
| Voluntary cuts by Saudi Arabia & Russia combined | 0.75 million b/d |
| Number of current OPEC core members (post-UAE exit) | 11 |
| Number of OPEC+ partner (non-OPEC) countries | 10 |
| World proven crude oil reserves (end-2023, OPEC ASB 2024) | 1,570 billion barrels |
| OPEC Member Countries’ share of proven reserves | ~1,241 billion barrels (79%) |
| Saudi Arabia’s 2025 average crude production | 9.33 million b/d |
| Russia’s 2025 average crude production | 9.11 million b/d |
| Iraq’s 2025 average crude production | 4.33 million b/d |
| UAE’s 2025 average crude production | 3.36 million b/d |
| Kazakhstan’s 2025 average crude production | 1.75 million b/d |
| OPEC total crude oil production capacity (2025 estimate) | 32.20 million b/d |
| OPEC surplus crude oil production capacity (2025 average) | 4.21 million b/d |
| Brent crude oil spot price average (March 2026) | $103/barrel |
| EIA Brent price peak forecast (Q2 2026) | $115/barrel |
| World total crude oil production (2025 annual average) | 78.93 million b/d |
| OPEC+ total crude oil production (2025 annual average) | 36.67 million b/d |
| Next scheduled full OPEC+ ministerial meeting | June 7, 2026 |
| OPEC headquarters location | Vienna, Austria |
| OPEC founding year | 1960 |
| Angola departure year from OPEC | 2024 |
| UAE departure announcement date from OPEC | April 28, 2026 |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook — April 2026; OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2024
The numbers above represent a coalition wrestling with its own contradictions in 2026. On one hand, OPEC+ still controls a production quota framework that covers 39.725 million barrels per day — a volume so immense it can single-handedly reshape global inflation, airline profitability, and the fiscal budgets of dozens of nations. On the other hand, the actual production figure sits closer to ~38.1 million b/d once voluntary cuts by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman are factored in. The gap between the official quota and real output is not mere bureaucratic slippage — it reflects a deliberate strategy by key producers who worry that releasing supply too quickly would crash the price they need to fund their national budgets. The UAE’s shock exit announcement on April 28, 2026 adds a fresh layer of complexity: a country producing over 3.36 million b/d walking out the door mid-year is not a footnote — it rewrites the coalition’s arithmetic heading into the second half of 2026.
What makes the OPEC+ facts for 2026 particularly striking is the reserve picture. OPEC member countries alone hold approximately 1,241 billion barrels of proven crude reserves, which is roughly 79% of the world’s total. This geological monopoly — more than three-quarters of the planet’s recoverable oil sitting under the soil of OPEC members — is the ultimate source of the group’s power. No amount of U.S. shale growth, Brazilian deepwater expansion, or Guyanese development can fundamentally displace this reality over any near-term horizon. The Brent crude oil price surging to a March 2026 average of $103 per barrel and the EIA’s forecast of a Q2 2026 peak at $115/barrel — driven by Strait of Hormuz disruptions from the Iran conflict — are a stark reminder of just how much the physical geography of OPEC+ reserves still moves global markets, even in an era where energy transition headlines dominate the financial press.
OPEC+ Members 2026 | Full Member List and Production Data
| Country | Group | 2025 Avg. Production (mb/d) | Subject to OPEC+ Quota? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | OPEC Core | 9.33 | Yes |
| Russia | OPEC+ Partner | 9.11 | Yes |
| Iraq | OPEC Core | 4.33 | Yes |
| United Arab Emirates | OPEC Core (exiting May 2026) | 3.36 | Yes |
| Iran | OPEC Core | 3.38 | No (exempt) |
| Kuwait | OPEC Core | 2.49 | Yes |
| Kazakhstan | OPEC+ Partner | 1.75 | Yes |
| Libya | OPEC Core | 1.29 | No (exempt) |
| Nigeria | OPEC Core | 1.41 | Yes |
| Mexico | OPEC+ Partner | 1.43 | No (excluded) |
| Oman | OPEC+ Partner | 0.77 | Yes |
| Algeria | OPEC Core | 0.93 | Yes |
| Venezuela | OPEC Core | 0.94 | No (exempt) |
| Congo (Brazzaville) | OPEC Core | 0.24 | Yes |
| Gabon | OPEC Core | 0.24 | Yes |
| Azerbaijan | OPEC+ Partner | 0.45 | Yes |
| Malaysia | OPEC+ Partner | 0.37 | Yes |
| Bahrain | OPEC+ Partner | 0.18 | Yes |
| Brunei | OPEC+ Partner | 0.09 | Yes |
| South Sudan | OPEC+ Partner | 0.11 | Yes |
| Sudan | OPEC+ Partner | 0.03 | Yes |
| Equatorial Guinea | OPEC Core | 0.05 | Yes |
| OPEC+ Total (Annual Avg. 2025) | — | ~36.67 | — |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook Table 3d — April 2026
The member list above captures the full breadth of a coalition that spans three continents, seven time zones, and wildly divergent economic circumstances. Saudi Arabia and Russia are the twin anchors, together producing over 18.44 million b/d in 2025 — more than half the entire OPEC+ bloc’s output between just two countries. Their 0.75 million b/d combined voluntary cut heading into 2026 signals the degree of control these two producers exercise over the alliance’s direction. Iraq at 4.33 million b/d is the third-largest contributor, though Baghdad has repeatedly been cited for compliance issues, producing above its quota before submitting compensation plans. Iran, Libya, and Venezuela remain exempt from the quota framework — a deliberate carve-out reflecting the reality that sanctions, civil conflict, and economic collapse have made it politically impractical to impose hard ceilings on these producers.
Three OPEC+ partner countries — Azerbaijan (0.45 mb/d), Malaysia (0.37 mb/d), and Bahrain (0.18 mb/d) — are relatively small contributors by volume, but their symbolic presence matters. They give the agreement a genuinely global character and prevent it from looking purely like a Gulf–Russia duopoly. Kazakhstan at 1.75 million b/d is a meaningful non-OPEC+ partner player, and Astana’s persistent overproduction headaches — driven by international oil company commitments at the Tengiz field — have tested the alliance’s discipline repeatedly. The OPEC+ total 2025 annual average of approximately 36.67 million b/d is noticeably below the official quota ceiling of 39.725 million b/d for 2026, reflecting the sustained effect of voluntary cuts that have kept roughly 3.24 million b/d off the market heading into the current year.
OPEC+ Crude Oil Production 2026 | EIA Quarterly Forecast
| Quarter | World Total | OPEC+ Total | OPEC Total | OPEC Members (Quota) | OPEC+ Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 2026 | 77.28 | 34.72 | 26.36 | 20.85 | 13.88 |
| Q2 2026 | 72.94 | 30.90 | 21.86 | 16.58 | 14.32 |
| Q3 2026 | 77.74 | 35.43 | 26.23 | 21.00 | 14.43 |
| Q4 2026 | 80.03 | 37.27 | 28.09 | 22.86 | 14.42 |
| Full Year 2026 Avg. | 77.01 | 34.59 | 25.64 | 20.33 | 14.26 |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook Table 3d — April 2026 (Completed April 6, 2026)
The quarterly production forecast for OPEC+ in 2026 reveals a trajectory that is anything but smooth. Q2 2026 is the standout outlier — OPEC+ total output collapses to just 30.90 million b/d, and the world total craters to 72.94 million b/d, both dramatically below the other three quarters. This is not a production strategy choice — it is the EIA’s modeled impact of the Strait of Hormuz disruption triggered by the conflict involving Iran, which caused Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain to collectively shut in an estimated 7.5 million barrels per day of crude output in March 2026, rising to an estimated 9.1 million b/d in April. The OPEC member quota-subject countries see their production fall to just 16.58 million b/d in Q2 2026, compared to 22.86 million b/d in Q4 2026 — a swing of over 6.28 million b/d within a single calendar year, which underlines the extraordinary volatility this conflict has injected into the supply picture.
The full-year 2026 OPEC+ average of 34.59 million b/d is pulled sharply downward by the Q2 shock. Under normal market conditions, the EIA’s pre-conflict models had suggested OPEC+ production growth of 0.6 million b/d for 2026, consistent with the group’s phased unwinding of its voluntary cuts. The Hormuz disruption has effectively neutralized that planned growth and then some. The OPEC+ partner countries — Russia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Oman, and others — show a far more stable quarterly profile, hovering between 13.88 and 14.43 million b/d across all four quarters of 2026, because their production infrastructure sits entirely outside the Gulf conflict zone. This geographic split is reshaping how analysts think about OPEC+ resilience: the non-Gulf members are quietly becoming the “stable floor” of the alliance while the Gulf core experiences unprecedented supply volatility.
OPEC+ Crude Oil Price Forecast 2026 | Brent & WTI
| Metric | 2025 Average | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 (Forecast) | Q4 2026 (Forecast) | Full Year 2026 | 2027 Forecast |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brent Crude ($/barrel) | — | — | Peak ~$115 | Below $90 | — | Avg. $76 |
| Brent Spot Price (March 2026 actual) | — | $103 | — | — | — | — |
| Brent–WTI Spread (March 2026) | — | $12/b | — | — | — | — |
| U.S. Retail Gasoline (Monthly Peak) | — | — | ~$4.30/gal (April) | — | >$3.70/gal avg. | — |
| U.S. Retail Diesel (Monthly Peak) | — | — | >$5.80/gal (April) | — | Avg. $4.80/gal | — |
| Global Oil Demand Growth | ~1.2 mb/d | — | — | — | 0.6 mb/d | — |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook — April 7, 2026
The 2026 oil price story is being written by geography and conflict, not supply management or cartel discipline. The Brent crude oil spot price hitting $103 per barrel in March 2026 — and forecast to peak at $115/barrel in Q2 2026 — represents the most dramatic price spike since the post-COVID recovery of 2021–2022. The EIA is explicit about the driver: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted oil flows from some of the world’s most prolific producers, draining global inventories at a rate of 5.1 million b/d in Q2 2026 alone. The Brent–WTI spread widening to $12 per barrel in March 2026 tells a secondary story — landlocked U.S. shale oil cannot reach the supply-starved global markets as efficiently as seaborne Brent barrels, so European and Asian buyers are paying a sharp premium. By Q4 2026, EIA expects Brent to fall back below $90/barrel as Hormuz traffic gradually resumes, and to average just $76/barrel in 2027 as the supply shock fully unwinds.
For ordinary consumers, the 2026 OPEC+-linked price shock translates directly into wallets. U.S. retail gasoline is forecast to peak at close to $4.30 per gallon in April 2026, while diesel — the lifeblood of trucking, agriculture, and manufacturing — surges past $5.80 per gallon at its peak and averages $4.80 per gallon for the full year. These are not abstract economic statistics; they compress profit margins across supply chains, accelerate inflation in food and goods prices, and create political pressure on governments from Washington to New Delhi to release strategic petroleum reserves or negotiate emergency supply agreements. The EIA’s revised global oil demand growth estimate of just 0.6 million b/d for 2026 — down from the pre-conflict expectation of 1.2 million b/d — reflects demand destruction as high prices force conservation, particularly across Asia, which is most dependent on Middle Eastern crude supplies.
OPEC Proven Oil Reserves 2025–2026 | By Country
| Country | Proven Reserves (Billion Barrels) | Global Rank | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venezuela | 303 | 1st | Largest proven reserves globally; Orinoco Belt heavy oil |
| Saudi Arabia | ~260 | 2nd | Most productive & cost-efficient reserves globally |
| Iran | ~210 | 3rd | Under Western sanctions; exempt from OPEC+ quotas |
| Iraq | ~145 | 4th | 3rd-largest OPEC+ producer by volume |
| Kuwait | ~102 | 6th | Small nation, massive reserves per capita |
| UAE | ~98 | 7th | Exiting OPEC May 2026; wants higher production quota |
| Libya | ~48 | 9th | Exempt from OPEC+ quotas due to civil conflict |
| Nigeria | ~37 | 10th | Sub-Saharan Africa’s top OPEC producer |
| Algeria | ~12 | — | Consistent quota-compliant OPEC member |
| Gabon | ~2 | — | Rejoined OPEC 2023; quota disputes a concern |
| Republic of Congo | ~2 | — | Small producer, committed OPEC member |
| Equatorial Guinea | <1 | — | Declining production trajectory |
| OPEC Total (End-2023) | ~1,241 | — | ~79% of world proven reserves |
| World Total (End-2023) | ~1,570 | — | Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2024 |
Data Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2024 (59th Edition); U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Statistics
The reserve table above is perhaps the most arresting single document in global energy economics. OPEC member countries collectively hold approximately 1,241 billion barrels of proven crude reserves — roughly 79% of all the oil that can be commercially extracted anywhere on earth under current technology and prices. This is not a recent development or a product of new discoveries; it is a geological fact that has defined the global energy order for six decades and will continue to define it for decades more. Venezuela leads with 303 billion barrels — a number that is simultaneously the country’s greatest asset and, given the collapse of its production infrastructure and the devastation of its economy, a source of profound geopolitical tension as of 2026. Saudi Arabia at roughly 260 billion barrels is the more operationally relevant reserve giant: its reserves are cheaper to lift, better managed, and backed by Aramco’s world-class infrastructure.
The UAE’s reserve base of approximately 98 billion barrels adds crucial context to its exit from OPEC in 2026. Abu Dhabi had been lobbying for a higher production quota for years, arguing that its expanded production capacity — which crossed 3.5 million b/d in recent years — was not reflected in its quota allocation, which was calculated against a lower historical baseline. The departure is the direct consequence of a fundamental tension in OPEC’s quota architecture: countries that invest to expand capacity find themselves penalized by a system that rewards historical output levels rather than current potential. Nigeria’s 37 billion barrels of reserves have been chronically underutilized due to infrastructure challenges, theft from pipelines, and regulatory uncertainty — a recurring frustration that nearly drove Lagos to follow Angola out the door in 2023. The reserve map of OPEC+ is not just about geology; it is about which countries can actually translate barrels in the ground into barrels in the market, and in 2026, the Strait of Hormuz crisis has temporarily answered that question in the most brutal way possible.
OPEC+ Production Capacity & Surplus Capacity 2026 | EIA Data
| Metric | 2025 Annual Avg. | Q1 2026 | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 | Q4 2026 | 2026 Annual Avg. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OPEC Total Production Capacity | 32.20 | 28.52 | 21.90 | 26.27 | 30.64 | 26.84 |
| Middle East Capacity | 27.04 | 23.46 | 16.74 | 21.18 | 25.55 | 21.74 |
| Other OPEC Capacity | 5.17 | 5.07 | 5.16 | 5.09 | 5.09 | 5.10 |
| OPEC Surplus/Spare Capacity | 4.21 | 2.17 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 2.56 | 1.20 |
| Middle East Surplus Capacity | 4.15 | 2.14 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.52 | 1.16 |
| OPEC Unplanned Production Outages | 0.98 | 3.53 | — | — | — | — |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook Table 3d — April 2026 (Forecasts completed April 6, 2026)
Spare capacity — sometimes called the “swing capacity” of global oil markets — is OPEC’s most powerful policy lever. In normal times, the ability to quickly bring additional barrels online serves as a price stabilizer: when supply disrupts elsewhere, OPEC’s spare capacity buffers the shock. The 2025 annual average OPEC surplus capacity of 4.21 million b/d represented a robust cushion — more than double the 1.8 million b/d typical buffer considered necessary for comfortable market stability. But in Q2 2026, that cushion has effectively vanished to near zero (0.04 million b/d) across the entire OPEC bloc, with Middle East surplus capacity reduced to 0.00 million b/d — a reading that reflects the unprecedented nature of the Hormuz disruption. When spare capacity disappears, the market has no buffer against further shocks, which is precisely why the EIA is forecasting Brent at $115/barrel in Q2 2026.
The OPEC total production capacity number collapsing from 32.20 million b/d in 2025 to just 21.90 million b/d in Q2 2026 captures the full physical scale of the Middle East supply disruption. An estimated 3.53 million b/d of unplanned outages were recorded in Q1 2026 alone — three and a half times the 0.98 million b/d annual average of 2025. The recovery trajectory assumed in the EIA’s April 2026 model shows OPEC capacity climbing back to 30.64 million b/d by Q4 2026 as the conflict resolves and the Strait gradually reopens, with surplus capacity recovering to 2.56 million b/d by year-end. However, the EIA is explicit in noting this forecast is “highly dependent” on conflict duration assumptions, and that a prolonged disruption scenario would keep capacity and surplus at crisis-level lows for much of the year. For OPEC+, this crisis is simultaneously a test of the group’s cohesion and a reminder that physical geography — the concentration of member production in one of the world’s most contested waterways — remains the coalition’s deepest structural vulnerability.
OPEC+ vs. Non-OPEC+ Global Production 2026 | Market Share
| Producer Group / Country | 2025 Annual Avg. (mb/d) | 2026 Annual Avg. Forecast (mb/d) | Change (mb/d) |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPEC+ Total | 36.67 | 34.59 | −2.08 |
| United States | 13.59 | 13.51 | −0.08 |
| Non-OPEC+ (Excl. U.S.) | 28.68 | 28.91 | +0.23 |
| World Total | 78.93 | 77.01 | −1.92 |
| OPEC Total (Core Members) | 27.99 | 25.64 | −2.35 |
| OPEC+ Partner Countries Total | 14.28 | 14.26 | −0.02 |
| Saudi Arabia | 9.33 | — | — |
| Russia | 9.11 | — | — |
| Iraq | 4.33 | — | — |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook Table 3d — April 7, 2026
The shift in global oil production market share in 2026 is not the story the OPEC+ ministers planned to tell when they gathered in late 2025 and agreed to maintain group-wide quotas unchanged. The plan was a modest, managed increase in output. The Hormuz crisis has turned that into a sharp production decline — OPEC+ total output drops by an estimated 2.08 million b/d from 2025 to 2026, and the core OPEC member group falls by 2.35 million b/d. By contrast, non-OPEC+ producers (excluding the U.S.) actually grow output by 0.23 million b/d, and even the U.S. — facing its own headwinds from lower drilling incentives given price uncertainty — declines by only a modest 0.08 million b/d. This divergence is quietly accelerating a structural trend that the EIA has tracked for years: OPEC+’s share of global crude production has been falling from the 53% it held when the expanded group was first formed in 2016, and the 2026 disruption is compressing it further.
The market share arithmetic for 2026 underscores a fundamental dynamic: OPEC+‘s influence on global oil prices comes not from volume dominance alone but from the perceived ability to manage that volume. When a crisis removes the group’s ability to exercise that management — either because production facilities are shut in or because the Strait of Hormuz is blocked — the coalition loses both barrels and credibility simultaneously. The United States at 13.51 million b/d in 2026 remains the world’s single largest national producer, a position it has held consistently since the shale revolution of the early 2010s. The EIA notes that U.S. crude production grew by 0.3 million b/d in 2024 and 0.4 million b/d in 2025, mostly from the Permian Basin, before the forecast 0.08 million b/d dip in 2026 — a deceleration, not a collapse. The story of 2026 oil production is, ultimately, a story about how the geography of OPEC+ membership — concentrated in the world’s most conflict-prone region — creates systemic risk that neither quota management nor diplomatic coordination can fully hedge.
OPEC+ 2026 Production Quota Decisions | Key Policy Milestones
| Date / Meeting | Decision | Production Impact |
|---|---|---|
| November 30, 2025 (40th Ministerial Meeting) | Group-wide 2026 quotas maintained unchanged | Official quota: 39.725 million b/d |
| November 30, 2025 | New capacity assessment mechanism approved | Will determine quotas from 2027 onwards |
| Q1 2026 | Pause on output hikes maintained (Jan–Mar 2026) | No additional barrels released in Q1 |
| Voluntary Cut Extension | Saudi Arabia + Russia maintain combined 0.75 mb/d voluntary cut | Effective quota ~38.1 mb/d |
| Eight-country voluntary cuts | Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Oman | Additional ~2.2 mb/d withheld |
| Outstanding group cuts (as of late 2025) | ~3.24 million b/d still withheld from market | ~3% of global demand withheld |
| OPEC+ production increase (April 2025–present) | ~2.9 mb/d released into market since April 2025 | Phased unwind underway before Hormuz crisis |
| Next Full Ministerial Meeting | June 7, 2026 | Agenda: Review supply amid conflict disruption |
| UAE exit effective date | May 1, 2026 | ~3.15 mb/d of Q1 production moves outside OPEC |
| Angola departure | Already exited 2024 | Removed ~0.24 mb/d from OPEC accounting |
Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook — April 2026; OPEC+ Declaration of Cooperation reporting
The production policy timeline of OPEC+ heading into 2026 was, before the Hormuz crisis, a fairly legible story of gradual unwinding. The 40th Ministerial Meeting on November 30, 2025 locked in the group’s official 39.725 million b/d quota framework for the full year and tasked the OPEC Secretariat with designing a new capacity measurement mechanism to replace the aging baseline system that had plagued quota negotiations for years — particularly for countries like the UAE, which had expanded capacity well beyond its historical reference points. The decision to pause output hikes through Q1 2026 reflected the group’s read on a well-supplied market; the EIA had estimated inventory builds of 1.9 million b/d in the second half of 2025 and over 2.3 million b/d in Q1 2026 under pre-conflict assumptions. The strategy was coherent: hold steady, let inventories build modestly, and then reassess at the June 7, 2026 meeting with more data.
The UAE’s April 28, 2026 withdrawal announcement — effective May 1, 2026 — lands against this backdrop as a fundamentally disruptive event. Abu Dhabi’s departure is rooted in years of frustration with a quota system that repeatedly underweighted its expanded production capacity. The new capacity assessment mechanism approved in November 2025 was partly designed to address this grievance, but evidently was not enough to keep the UAE in the fold. The departure of a country producing over 3 million b/d strips the OPEC+ framework of a significant volume contributor and, more importantly, of one of the few members with meaningful spare capacity. The eight-country voluntary cut framework — binding Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman to additional production restraint beyond the quota baseline — will need to be renegotiated without Abu Dhabi at the table. The June 7, 2026 ministerial meeting will be one of the most consequential in the alliance’s history.
Disclaimer: The data research report we present here is based on information found from various sources. We are not liable for any financial loss, errors, or damages of any kind that may result from the use of the information herein. We acknowledge that though we try to report accurately, we cannot verify the absolute facts of everything that has been represented.
