Global Tariff by the US Government 2026
February 20, 2026 will go down as one of the most consequential single days in modern American trade history. The United States Supreme Court delivered a 6-3 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, declaring that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs — striking down the legal backbone of the sweeping reciprocal tariff regime that had reshaped global trade since April 2025. Within hours of that ruling, President Trump signed a new executive order imposing a 10% global tariff on all countries under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, effective February 24, 2026 at 12:01 a.m. EST — the first time in history the US has invoked that authority for tariffs. What unfolded on that Friday was simultaneously a major legal defeat for the administration and a defiant doubling down: the President declared all Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs remain “in full force and effect,” announced new Section 301 trade investigations, and made clear his intent to keep tariff revenue flowing regardless of the court’s decision.
The broader picture painted by the US global tariff statistics in 2026 tells a story of dramatic restructuring. Over 2025, the average effective US tariff rate surged from 2.4% at the start of 2024 to 7.7% by end of 2025 — the highest since 1947 — before climbing even higher mid-year to a peak of around 17.9% during the height of the IEEPA tariff era. The federal government collected a record-breaking $264 billion in customs duties in calendar year 2025, a 234% jump from $79 billion in 2024. With IEEPA tariffs now struck down but the new Section 122 global 10% tariff replacing them, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told the Economic Club of Dallas that the new legal framework “will result in virtually unchanged tariff revenue in 2026.” The framework has permanently altered how the United States does business with the rest of the world — and the numbers below tell that story in full.
Interesting Facts: US Global Tariff in 2026
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Supreme Court ruling date | February 20, 2026 — SCOTUS ruled 6-3 that IEEPA cannot authorize tariffs (Learning Resources v. Trump) |
| New global tariff signed | President Trump signed a 10% global tariff under Section 122, Trade Act of 1974 on February 20, 2026 |
| Effective date of new tariff | February 24, 2026 at 12:01 a.m. EST |
| Duration of Section 122 tariff | Limited to 150 days — requires Congressional approval to extend |
| Maximum tariff under Section 122 | Up to 15% — Trump invoked the current 10% rate |
| First-ever use of Section 122 | This is the first time in US history any President has used Section 122 to impose tariffs |
| IEEPA tariffs struck down | All tariffs imposed under IEEPA are invalid per SCOTUS; refund exposure estimated at $130–$175 billion |
| Section 232 & 301 status | Remain fully in force — not affected by the SCOTUS ruling |
| Average effective tariff rate (peak, 2025) | Hit ~27% in April 2025 — the highest level in over a century |
| Average effective tariff rate without IEEPA (Feb 2026) | 9.1% — still the highest since 1946, per Yale Budget Lab |
| Record customs revenue, calendar year 2025 | $264 billion — up 234% from $79 billion in 2024 (Tax Foundation / US Treasury) |
| Household cost of remaining tariffs (2026) | Estimated average $400 per US household in 2026 after IEEPA struck down (Tax Foundation) |
| Potential refund exposure | Up to $170 billion could be owed back to importers who paid IEEPA tariffs |
| Nobel economists warning | 23 Nobel Prize-winning economists signed a letter warning Trump tariffs would “lead to higher prices, larger deficits, and greater inequality” |
| China tariff rate (post-IEEPA ruling) | 35% total — comprised of existing 25% Section 301 duties plus new 10% global Section 122 tariff |
| Steel & aluminum tariff rate (Section 232) | 50% — raised from 25% in June 2025 and still fully in effect |
| US trade deficit, full year 2025 | $901.5 billion — nearly unchanged from $903.5 billion in 2024 (BEA, Feb 19, 2026) |
| Goods deficit with China (2025) | $202.1 billion — down sharply from $295.4 billion in 2024 (US Census Bureau / BEA) |
| US imports from China, 2025 | Fell 28% year-over-year, while US exports to China dropped 38% (Project44 data) |
Source: White House Fact Sheet (February 20, 2026); Tax Foundation Tariff Tracker (February 20, 2026); Yale Budget Lab State of US Tariffs (February 20, 2026); US Bureau of Economic Analysis Annual Trade Report (February 19, 2026); US Census Bureau; US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement.
The February 20, 2026 Supreme Court ruling instantly reshaped the entire US global tariff landscape. The administration’s reliance on IEEPA — an emergency powers statute from 1977 — had been the legal scaffolding supporting the most sweeping tariff hikes America had seen since the Great Depression era. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that the Constitution “very clearly” places the taxing power in Congress, not the executive branch. The President, defiant and combative at a White House press briefing, called the ruling “terrible” and “an embarrassment” and said he was “absolutely ashamed” of certain justices — including two he himself nominated. Yet within the same afternoon, he confirmed the replacement plan was already signed: a 10% universal tariff under Section 122, framed as a “temporary import duty” to address the United States’ “large and serious balance-of-payments deficit.” The fact that this authority had never been used before for tariffs in all of American history — not even by Nixon in 1971 when he imposed a similar surcharge under a different law — underscores how unprecedented the current moment truly is.
The economic implications ripple far beyond Washington D.C. The $901.5 billion trade deficit recorded in full-year 2025 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis barely budged despite all the tariff drama, falling only $2.1 billion from 2024. Imports surged in the first half of 2025 as businesses front-loaded orders before expected tariff hikes, then contracted sharply in the second half. The result: a near-flat annual deficit but a wild intra-year ride. Tariffs clearly shifted where the US buys goods — the China deficit fell $93.4 billion while the Vietnam deficit surged $55 billion and the Taiwan deficit nearly doubled to $146.8 billion — but the overall trade gap remained stubbornly wide, undermining the administration’s core justification for the tariff program.
Section 122 Global 10% Tariff in the US 2026
| Parameter | Details |
|---|---|
| Legal Authority | Section 122, Trade Act of 1974 |
| Tariff Rate | 10% ad valorem on all imported articles |
| Effective Date | February 24, 2026, 12:01 a.m. EST |
| Duration | 150 days (expires ~July 24, 2026 absent Congressional extension) |
| Maximum Allowable Rate | 15% under Section 122 |
| Trigger Condition | “Large and serious” balance-of-payments deficit or dollar depreciation risk |
| Congressional Requirement | Extension beyond 150 days requires Congressional approval |
| First Use in History | Yes — never previously invoked to impose tariffs |
| China total rate (post-ruling) | 35% (25% Section 301 + 10% Section 122) |
| Exemptions (Annex II goods) | Certain agricultural products (beef, tomatoes, oranges), some pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, some electronics, passenger vehicles, copper, semiconductors, lumber |
| De minimis treatment | Suspension of $800 duty-free threshold continues under separate Executive Order |
| Stacking rules | Section 122 does not stack on Section 232 tariffs for steel, aluminum, copper, lumber, autos, and auto parts |
| Revenue projection (2026) | Treasury Secretary Bessent: “virtually unchanged tariff revenue in 2026” vs. prior IEEPA framework |
| Effective tariff rate impact | Bloomberg Economics estimates: could lift average US effective rate to 16.5% or lower it to 11.4% depending on exemptions |
Source: White House Fact Sheet – “President Donald J. Trump Imposes a Temporary Import Duty to Address Fundamental International Payment Problems” (whitehouse.gov, February 20, 2026); Trade Compliance Resource Hub Tariff Tracker (February 20, 2026); CNN, CNBC, Bloomberg (February 20–21, 2026).
The Section 122 global tariff is in many ways both a continuation and a downgrade of what came before. The IEEPA reciprocal tariffs had reached as high as 125% on some Chinese goods and imposed country-specific rates varying from 10% to 50% across dozens of nations. The new universal 10% baseline brings more predictability but considerably less leverage — and crucially, it expires automatically after 150 days. Without Congressional action, the entire legal foundation for these tariffs dissolves by around July 24, 2026. Trump’s trade representative Jamieson Greer called the administration’s alternative legal measures “incredibly legally durable,” and Treasury Secretary Bessent emphasized that the combination of Section 122, enhanced Section 232, and Section 301 authorities will preserve revenue. Still, experts from Euronews to the Tax Foundation note that these alternative pathways come with “considerably tighter constraints” — slower, more procedurally intensive, and less scope for the sweeping, country-wide emergency levies that defined the IEEPA era.
US Customs Duty Revenue Statistics in the US 2026
| Period | Revenue Collected | Source / Authority |
|---|---|---|
| FY 2016 baseline | $40.1 billion | CBP Trade Statistics (all duties, taxes, fees) |
| FY 2024 | ~$88 billion | CBP Trade Statistics / Monthly Treasury Statement |
| FY 2025 (Oct 2024 – Sep 2025) | $195 billion (CRFB) / $216.7 billion (AAF/CBP) | US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement; CBP |
| Calendar Year 2025 (Jan–Dec) | $264 billion (Tax Foundation) / $287 billion (Richmond Fed/DHS) | US Treasury daily data via Haver Analytics; DHS |
| Peak monthly revenue (Oct 2025) | $31.35 billion | US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement |
| Nov 2025 monthly revenue | $30.76 billion | US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement |
| Dec 2025 monthly revenue | $27.89 billion | US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement |
| FY 2026 (Oct–Dec 2025, first 3 months) | $90 billion — up 332% vs. same period FY 2025 | USAFacts / US Treasury |
| Jan 2026 new tariff revenue | ~$20.1 billion above 2022–2024 average | Yale Budget Lab (Feb 18, 2026) |
| YoY increase, full calendar 2025 | +192% to +234% vs. 2024 | Richmond Fed / Tax Foundation |
| Customs as % of total federal revenue (FY 2025) | 3.7% | USAFacts citing OMB & US Treasury |
| IEEPA tariff refund exposure | ~$130–$175 billion | CBP data; Bloomberg analysis; CRFB |
| 10-year Section 232 revenue projection (2026–2035) | $635 billion conventional / $490 billion dynamic | Tax Foundation (Feb 20, 2026) |
| TPC 10-year tariff revenue projection (without IEEPA) | $900 billion over 10 years; ~$101 billion in FY 2026 | Tax Policy Center |
Source: US Customs and Border Protection Trade Statistics (cbp.gov); US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement; Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (crfb.org, November 2025); Richmond Fed Macro Minute (January 12, 2026); Tax Foundation Tariff Tracker (February 20, 2026); USAFacts citing OMB & US Treasury; Yale Budget Lab (February 18, 2026); Tax Policy Center TPC Tariff Tracker (February 2026).
The tariff revenue figures reveal a story of extraordinary fiscal volatility in 2025. When Trump’s tariff program kicked into high gear after Liberation Day on April 2, 2025, monthly customs collections exploded — rising from $7.25 billion in February 2025 to a peak of $31.35 billion in October 2025. The subsequent dip in November and December — when the White House removed tariffs on goods like coffee, cocoa, and tropical fruits — trimmed the headline number, bringing December down to $27.89 billion, a more than 10% decline from the October peak. Even so, the full-year 2025 calendar total of $264 billion represented the highest annual customs collection in American history and marked the first time since the 19th century that customs duties represented a meaningful share of federal revenue at 3.7%. Now, with IEEPA tariff refund exposure potentially reaching $175 billion, the near-term fiscal picture is considerably more complicated — Trump himself acknowledged at the February 20 press briefing that the refund question “has to get litigated for the next two years.”
US Trade Deficit by Country Statistics 2026
| Country / Region | 2025 Goods Trade Deficit / Surplus | 2024 Comparison | Change YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| European Union | –$218.8 billion | –$235.6 billion | Narrowed $16.8B |
| China | –$202.1 billion | –$295.4 billion (est.) | Narrowed $93.4B |
| Mexico | –$196.9 billion | –$171.3 billion | Widened $25.6B |
| Vietnam | –$178.2 billion | –$123.5 billion | Widened $54.7B |
| Taiwan | –$146.8 billion | –$73.7 billion | Widened $73.1B |
| Ireland | –$114.2 billion | — | — |
| Germany | –$73.0 billion | — | — |
| Thailand | –$71.9 billion | — | — |
| Japan | –$63.9 billion | — | — |
| India | –$58.2 billion | — | — |
| South Korea | –$56.4 billion | — | — |
| Canada | –$46.4 billion | — | — |
| Netherlands | +$60.7 billion surplus | — | — |
| United Kingdom | +$32.2 billion surplus | — | — |
| Overall US Goods & Services Deficit (2025) | –$901.5 billion | –$903.5 billion | Narrowed $2.1B |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis / US Census Bureau – “US International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2025” (bea.gov, released February 19, 2026); US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division (census.gov/foreign-trade).
The 2025 bilateral trade deficit data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis just one day before the Supreme Court ruling — on February 19, 2026 — provides critical context for understanding why the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressive tariff policies. Despite a $93.4 billion shrinkage in the China deficit, the overall US goods and services trade gap barely moved, declining only $2.1 billion from $903.5 billion in 2024 to $901.5 billion in 2025. This happened because trade flows simply redirected rather than rebalanced: the Vietnam deficit surged $54.7 billion and the Taiwan deficit nearly doubled, as manufacturing shifted away from China into Southeast Asian and East Asian alternatives. This pattern of “tariff diversion” rather than genuine reshoring is precisely the dynamic that critics of the tariff program have pointed to all along — and it is the same pattern that the Trump administration cites as justification for imposing tariffs even more broadly, arguing that country-specific rates simply push trade into alternative channels that must themselves be targeted. The total deficit figure of $901.5 billion — still among the largest in recorded US history — anchors the administration’s legal argument under Section 122, which specifically authorizes tariffs to address a “large and serious balance-of-payments deficit.”
Country-Specific Tariff Rates in the US 2026
| Country / Region | Tariff Rate(s) in Effect (as of Feb 21, 2026) | Legal Authority |
|---|---|---|
| China | 35% total (25% Section 301 + 10% Section 122) | Section 301 (Trade Act 1974) + Section 122 |
| Steel imports (all countries) | 50% (raised from 25% in June 2025) | Section 232, Trade Expansion Act 1962 |
| Aluminum imports (all countries) | 50% (raised from 10% in 2025) | Section 232 |
| Imported passenger cars (most countries) | 25% | Section 232 |
| Auto parts (most countries) | 25% (reduced to 10% for UK; 15% for Japan, South Korea, EU) | Section 232 |
| Copper | Section 232 tariff in effect since August 1, 2025 | Section 232 |
| Lumber / Timber | Section 232 tariff in effect since October 14, 2025 | Section 232 |
| Medium & Heavy-Duty Vehicles | Section 232 tariff in effect since November 1, 2025 | Section 232 |
| Ship-to-Shore (STS) Cranes (China-origin) | 100% | Section 301 |
| All other countries (baseline) | 10% new Section 122 global tariff | Section 122, Trade Act 1974 |
| Taiwan | 15% (reduced from 20% IEEPA reciprocal per Jan 15, 2026 trade deal) — now subject to 10% Section 122 | Section 122 (trade deal rate to be honored) |
| India | 18% (reduced from 25% per Feb 2, 2026 agreement on Russian oil) — now subject to Section 122 | Section 122 + trade deal |
| Countries buying Iranian oil | Additional 25% tariff (announced Jan 12, 2026) | Executive Order |
| Canada & Mexico (USMCA-compliant goods) | 0% — USMCA exemption; 87–89% of imports claiming exemption by late 2025 | USMCA |
Source: Tax Foundation Tariff Tracker (taxfoundation.org, February 20, 2026); White House Fact Sheet (whitehouse.gov, February 20, 2026); Trade Compliance Resource Hub (tradecomplianceresourcehub.com, February 20, 2026); US Customs and Border Protection Trade Statistics (cbp.gov); Penn Wharton Budget Model (budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu, February 3, 2026).
The country-specific tariff landscape as of February 21, 2026 reflects a system that is part punitive, part negotiated, and part legally improvised. China remains the most heavily targeted trading partner at an effective 35% combined rate, though this is a dramatic reduction from the 145%+ rates briefly in effect during the peak IEEPA period earlier in 2025. For Canada and Mexico, the story is one of successful legal arbitrage: by aggressively leveraging USMCA rules of origin, importers pushed the USMCA exemption rate to nearly 89% of all Canadian and Mexican imports by November 2025, effectively nullifying much of the intended tariff impact on North American trade flows. Steel and aluminum remain the hardest-hit product categories, with the 50% Section 232 rate driving effective tariffs on those products to the 39.8–40% range when measured as a share of total import value. The Taiwan deal (January 15, 2026) and the India agreement (February 2, 2026) show the administration is willing to negotiate reductions — but both those bilateral arrangements now need to be mapped onto the new Section 122 global 10% framework, creating fresh legal and operational complexity for customs officials and importers alike.
Economic Impact of Global Tariffs in the US 2026
| Economic Indicator | Data / Estimate | Source & Date |
|---|---|---|
| Avg. effective tariff rate (Jan 2024) | 2.4% | Tax Foundation |
| Avg. effective tariff rate (peak, Apr–Aug 2025) | ~27% (highest in over a century) | Wikipedia / Tax Foundation |
| Avg. effective tariff rate (Nov 2025) | 10.5% (Penn Wharton); 11.7% (Yale Budget Lab); 11.4% (Richmond Fed) | Penn Wharton Budget Model; Yale Budget Lab; Richmond Fed |
| Avg. effective tariff rate (post-IEEPA, Feb 2026) | 9.1% — highest since 1946 (excl. 2025) | Yale Budget Lab, Feb 20, 2026 |
| Avg. household tariff cost (2025, all tariffs) | ~$1,000 per US household | Tax Foundation |
| Avg. household tariff cost (2026, Section 232 only) | ~$400 per US household | Tax Foundation, Feb 20, 2026 |
| Avg. household tariff cost (2026, without IEEPA) | ~$800 per household (price level rise of 0.6%) | Yale Budget Lab, Feb 20, 2026 |
| US GDP growth impact (2025) | –0.5 percentage points lower real GDP growth | Yale Budget Lab |
| US GDP growth impact (2026) | –0.4 percentage points lower real GDP growth | Yale Budget Lab |
| Long-run GDP impact (Section 232 only) | –0.2% reduction in long-run US GDP | Tax Foundation |
| Manufacturing output (long-run) | +2.9% expansion from tariffs | Yale Budget Lab |
| Construction output (long-run) | –4.1% contraction from tariffs | Yale Budget Lab |
| Unemployment rate impact (end of 2026) | +0.3 percentage points higher (post-IEEPA scenario) | Yale Budget Lab, Feb 20, 2026 |
| Payroll employment effect (end of 2025) | ~490,000 fewer jobs | Yale Budget Lab |
| US GDP Q4 2025 growth | +1.4% annualized (advance estimate) | Bureau of Economic Analysis |
| US imports from China (2025) | Down 28% YoY | Project44 shipping data |
| US exports to China (2025) | Down 38% YoY | Project44 shipping data |
| Consumer price passthrough to imported core goods | 31%–63% of tariff cost passed through | Yale Budget Lab / NY Fed |
| Foreign retaliation scope (as of Sep 2025) | $223 billion of US exports affected by retaliatory tariffs | Tax Foundation |
Source: Tax Foundation Tariff Tracker (taxfoundation.org, February 20, 2026); Yale Budget Lab “State of US Tariffs: February 20, 2026” (budgetlab.yale.edu); Penn Wharton Budget Model (budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu, February 3, 2026); Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP advance estimate (Q4 2025); Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics (February 12, 2026); Project44 shipping data (January 2026).
The economic scorecard on US global tariffs in 2026 is one of real but uneven effects. On the positive side for the administration’s narrative, manufacturing output is projected to expand in the long run — and US goods exports have diversified. But the broader macroeconomic toll is hard to ignore: GDP growth was trimmed by an estimated 0.5 percentage points in 2025 and faces another 0.4-point drag in 2026, payroll employment came in roughly 490,000 lower than it would have been without the tariffs, and consumer prices on imported goods rose by 0.6%–1.2% depending on the scenario. The pass-through of tariff costs to consumers has been significant — between 31% and 63% for core imported goods and even higher for durables, per the New York Fed and Yale Budget Lab — meaning that while the White House’s argument that “foreign countries pay the tariffs” made for good politics, the economic literature firmly establishes that US importers and consumers absorb the vast majority of the burden. The post-IEEPA scenario, with a 9.1% average effective rate and a $800 average household cost, is less severe than the peak IEEPA era — but it remains historically elevated, and the administration’s stated intent to pursue enhanced Section 232 and Section 301 investigations means the current rate floor is unlikely to fall meaningfully in the near term.
Tariff Legislation and Legal Timeline in the US 2026
| Date | Event | Authority / Action |
|---|---|---|
| January 20, 2025 | Trump inaugurated; tariff agenda begins | Executive action |
| February 4, 2025 | 10% tariff on China takes effect (fentanyl/border IEEPA) | IEEPA |
| March 4, 2025 | 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico take effect | IEEPA |
| March 12, 2025 | 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum (all countries, no exemptions) | Section 232 |
| April 2, 2025 | “Liberation Day” — sweeping reciprocal tariffs on nearly all countries; universal 10% baseline effective April 5 | IEEPA |
| April 3, 2025 | 25% tariff on imported passenger vehicles effective | Section 232 |
| May 3, 2025 | 25% tariff on auto parts effective | Section 232 |
| May 28, 2025 | US International Court of Trade rules IEEPA tariffs illegal | Court ruling |
| June 4, 2025 | Steel & aluminum Section 232 tariffs raised from 25% to 50% | Section 232 modification |
| June 11, 2025 | US-China trade deal — 30% total tariff on China (20% fentanyl + 10% reciprocal), higher rates paused 60 days | IEEPA negotiated deal |
| August 1, 2025 | Copper Section 232 tariff takes effect | Section 232 |
| August 7, 2025 | Country-specific reciprocal tariffs fully implemented; USMCA exemption share reaches 87–89% | IEEPA |
| August 29, 2025 | De minimis $800 exemption closed under IEEPA | IEEPA |
| October 14, 2025 | Lumber Section 232 tariff takes effect | Section 232 |
| November 1, 2025 | Heavy trucks, buses, truck parts Section 232 tariffs take effect | Section 232 |
| November 5, 2025 | Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Learning Resources v. Trump | SCOTUS |
| January 12, 2026 | 25% tariff announced on countries buying Iranian oil | Executive Order |
| January 15, 2026 | Taiwan trade deal — reciprocal rate lowered from 20% to 15% | IEEPA negotiated deal |
| February 2, 2026 | India reciprocal tariff lowered from 25% to 18%; Indian oil tariff lifted | IEEPA deal / Executive Order |
| February 20, 2026 | SCOTUS rules 6-3 — IEEPA cannot authorize tariffs (Learning Resources v. Trump) | Supreme Court ruling |
| February 20, 2026 | Trump signs 10% global tariff under Section 122 | Section 122, Trade Act 1974 |
| February 24, 2026 | Section 122 global 10% tariff takes effect at 12:01 a.m. EST | Section 122 |
| ~July 24, 2026 | Section 122 tariff expires absent Congressional extension (150-day limit) | Statutory limit |
Source: Tax Foundation Tariff Tracker (taxfoundation.org, February 20, 2026); Trade Compliance Resource Hub (tradecomplianceresourcehub.com, February 20, 2026); White House Fact Sheet (whitehouse.gov, February 20, 2026); CBP Trade Statistics (cbp.gov); Wikipedia “Tariffs in the second Trump administration” (updated February 21, 2026).
The legislative and legal timeline of US global tariffs from 2025 through 2026 is unlike anything in modern American trade law. In just over a year, the United States moved from a 2.4% average tariff rate to a 27% peak and back down to 9.1% — all within a legal framework that was ultimately overturned by the nation’s highest court. The critical insight from this timeline is that the Section 232 national security tariffs — on steel, aluminum, copper, lumber, vehicles, and their parts — have proven the most legally durable component of the entire edifice. Unlike IEEPA, which the court found exceeded presidential authority, Section 232 has survived multiple legal challenges and was not touched by the Learning Resources ruling. This makes the Section 232 framework the cornerstone of US tariff policy going forward, even as the Section 122 global tariff provides a temporary bridge rate. The 150-day clock on Section 122 already has the legal and business community focused on what happens around July 24, 2026 — a date that may well define the next chapter of the US global tariff statistics story.
Disclaimer: The data research report we present here is based on information found from various sources. We are not liable for any financial loss, errors, or damages of any kind that may result from the use of the information herein. We acknowledge that though we try to report accurately, we cannot verify the absolute facts of everything that has been represented.
