Fertility Rate in America 2026: What the Latest Data Tells Us
America is having fewer babies — and the numbers confirm it with unusual clarity. The United States general fertility rate in 2025 (the most recent year with CDC provisional data, released April 2026) hit 53.1 births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44, marking yet another all-time low in a trend that has now run nearly uninterrupted for almost two decades. To put that in perspective: in 2007, the rate peaked at the equivalent of roughly 2.12 children per woman — comfortably at the population replacement level of 2.1. By 2025, the total fertility rate (TFR) had sunk to approximately 1.6 births per woman, a figure that the Congressional Budget Office projects will remain near 1.6 through 2055 if current patterns hold. That single number — 1.6 versus 2.1 — captures one of the most consequential demographic shifts unfolding in America right now, with ripple effects that reach into labour markets, pension systems, school enrolments, housing demand, and the very structure of American society for decades to come.
What makes the 2026 picture especially striking is not just the continued decline, but the structural nature of it. This is not a blip tied to a single recession or pandemic. Since 2007, the general fertility rate has fallen by 23%, according to CDC demographer Brady Hamilton. The decline is being driven primarily by younger women — fertility among women in their teens and twenties has collapsed to record lows, while women in their 30s and 40s are having more children than ever before. For the first time in recorded US history, more babies are now being born to women over 40 than to teenagers. The 2025 provisional data shows that approximately 3,606,400 babies were born in the United States — roughly 710,000 fewer than in 2007, despite the fact that the overall female population of childbearing age is actually larger today than it was then. The following sections break down exactly what the latest data shows, who is having children, where, and why the trends matter so profoundly.
Interesting Facts: US Fertility Rate in 2026
US FERTILITY — TOP FACTS SNAPSHOT (2025–2026 CDC DATA)
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Total Fertility Rate (2025) █░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.6 children/woman
Replacement Level Target ██░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.1 children/woman
General Fertility Rate (2025) █████████░░░░░░░ 53.1 / 1,000 women
Total Births (2025) ████████████████ 3,606,400
Decline since 2007 peak (GFR) ████░░░░░░░░░░░░ -23%
Teen Birth Rate (2025) █░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 11.7 / 1,000 teens
Births over age 40 vs teens ██████████░░░░░░ MORE (first time in history)
Childless women aged 20-24 (2024) █████████████░░░ 85%
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
| Fact | Data (2025–2026 Latest) |
|---|---|
| Provisional total US births (2025) | 3,606,400 — down 1% from 2024 |
| General Fertility Rate (GFR) — 2025 | 53.1 births per 1,000 women ages 15–44 (new all-time low) |
| Total Fertility Rate (TFR) — 2024 final | ~1.599 children per woman — new all-time low |
| Population replacement level | 2.1 children per woman |
| Decline in GFR since 2007 peak | –23% (CDC, Brady Hamilton, April 2026) |
| US has been below replacement level since | Early 1970s (with only brief exceptions) |
| Teen birth rate (15–19), 2025 | 11.7 per 1,000 — down 7% from 2024; all-time record low |
| Birth rate, women aged 40–44 trend | Rising continuously since 1985 |
| Historic first (2023 milestone) | More babies born to women over 40 than to teenagers |
| Childless women aged 20–24 (2024) | 85% — up from 75% in 2014 |
| Childless women aged 25–29 (2024) | 63% — up from 50% in 2014 |
| Childless women aged 30–34 (2024) | ~40% — up from ~29% in 2014 |
| “Demographic cliff” — births foregone | 11.8 million fewer births than expected since 2007 (UNH Carsey School, 2025) |
| State with highest fertility rate (2024) | South Dakota — 66.7 births per 1,000 women |
| State with lowest fertility rate (2024) | Vermont — 41.6 per 1,000 (DC: 39.76) |
| Highest fertility rate among demographics | Hispanic women — 64.3 per 1,000 (2022–2024 avg., March of Dimes) |
| % births to unmarried women (2023) | 40.0% |
| Primary cesarean delivery rate (2024) | 22.9% (up from low of 19.3% in 2019) |
Source: CDC National Center for Health Statistics, Births: Provisional Data for 2025 (April 2026); CDC NCHS Data Brief No. 535, July 2025; Carsey School of Public Policy/UNH (September 2025); US Census Bureau (September 2025); March of Dimes PeriStats (May 2026)
Two facts from the table stand out as cultural landmarks rather than just statistics. The first is the milestone that, for the first time in recorded American history, women over 40 are outpacing teenagers in birth rates — a complete inversion of the 20th-century demographic norm. In 1990, women over 40 accounted for just 1.2% of all births; by 2023 that had risen to 4.1%, while the teen birth rate fell 73% over the same period. The second is the staggering rise in childlessness among younger women: 85% of American women aged 20 to 24 had not yet had a child in 2024, up from 75% a decade earlier — a ten-percentage-point jump in a single decade. That shift alone goes a long way toward explaining the “demographic cliff” that demographers now openly discuss: 11.8 million fewer births since 2007 than prior fertility patterns would have predicted.
US Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Historical Trend 2026
US TOTAL FERTILITY RATE — LONG-TERM DECLINE (children per woman)
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1960 (Baby Boom peak) ████████████████████████ 3.65
1970 (decline begins) ███████████████░░░░░░░░░ 2.48
1980 (below repl.) ████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.84
1990 ████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.08
2000 ████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.06
2007 (recent peak) ████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.12 ← last time at replacement
2010 ███████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.93
2015 ██████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.84
2020 █████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.64
2022 █████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.66
2023 █████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.62
2024 (all-time low) █████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~1.599
2025 (provisional) █████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~1.60 est.
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Replacement level = 2.1 | Each █ ≈ 0.15 children per woman
| Year | Total Fertility Rate (TFR) | Change | Key Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 | 3.65 | — | Baby Boom peak |
| 1970 | 2.48 | –32% from 1960 | Contraception, women entering workforce |
| 1980 | 1.84 | –26% from 1970 | Below replacement level |
| 1990 | 2.08 | +13% from 1980 | Near replacement; immigration boost |
| 2000 | 2.06 | Stable | Near replacement |
| 2007 | 2.12 | — | Most recent peak — at replacement level |
| 2010 | 1.93 | –9% | Great Recession impact begins |
| 2015 | 1.84 | –5% from 2010 | Continued structural decline |
| 2019 | 1.71 | –7% from 2015 | Pre-COVID low point |
| 2020 | 1.64 | –4% | COVID-19 pandemic year |
| 2021 | 1.66 | +1% | Slight pandemic rebound |
| 2022 | 1.66 | No change | Essentially flat |
| 2023 | 1.62 | –2% | Continued decline |
| 2024 | ~1.599 | –1% | New all-time low (CDC final data, July 2025) |
| 2025 | ~1.60 est. | Provisional | GFR down 1%; TFR final not yet released |
| CBO 2035 projection | 1.60 | — | Congressional Budget Office demographic forecast |
| CBO 2055 projection | 1.60 | — | CBO projects no meaningful recovery |
Source: Macrotrends US Fertility Rate 1950–2025; CDC/NCHS Blog (July 2025); Congressional Budget Office, Demographic Outlook 2025–2055; Child Trends (July 2025)
The long arc of this table tells a story that cuts across all political and cultural explanations. America has not maintained population replacement-level fertility in any sustained way since the early 1970s, which means this is not a new crisis — it is a structural reality more than half a century in the making. What changed in 2007 was the loss of the final period where the US had briefly returned close to the 2.1 replacement threshold, and since then the decline has been unusually persistent. The Great Recession knocked fertility rates sharply lower as young adults delayed marriage and children in the face of economic uncertainty, but unlike after previous economic downturns — when fertility partially recovered — the post-2008 era saw fertility continue declining even as the economy recovered. By 2024, the TFR of ~1.599 was officially the lowest ever recorded in the United States. The Congressional Budget Office’s long-run projections through 2055 see essentially no recovery, forecasting the TFR to remain at 1.60 for decades — a baseline that will accelerate population ageing, compress the working-age population, and put sustained upward pressure on Social Security, Medicare, and the broader fiscal position of the federal government.
US Fertility Rate by Age Group 2024–2025
BIRTH RATE BY AGE GROUP (per 1,000 women) — 2024 vs 2025 TREND
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Ages 15–19 ██░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 12.7 (2024) → 11.7 (2025) ↓7%
Ages 20–24 ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 55.8 (2024) — declining
Ages 25–29 ██████████████░░░░░░ 89.5 (2024) — declining
Ages 30–34 ████████████████████ 93.7 (2024) ← HIGHEST AGE GROUP
Ages 35–39 █████████████░░░░░░░ 56.3 (2024) — stable/slight rise
Ages 40–44 ████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 12.8 (2024) — rising continuously
Ages 45–49 ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0.8 (2024) — very low
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Each █ ≈ ~5 births per 1,000 women in age group
| Age Group | Birth Rate (2024 Final) | 2025 Provisional Trend | Direction vs 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ages 15–19 | 12.7 per 1,000 | 11.7 per 1,000 (–7%) | ↓ Steep decline (–73% since 1990) |
| Ages 20–24 | 55.8 per 1,000 | Declining | ↓ Continuing decline |
| Ages 25–29 | 89.5 per 1,000 | Declining | ↓ Continued decline |
| Ages 30–34 | 93.7 per 1,000 | Stable | ↑ Now the peak childbearing age (was 25–29 in 2004) |
| Ages 35–39 | ~56.3 per 1,000 | Unchanged | ↑ Rose 90% since 1990 |
| Ages 40–44 | ~12.8 per 1,000 | Rising | ↑ +193% since 1990; rising almost continuously since 1985 |
| Ages 45–49 | ~0.8 per 1,000 | Slight increase | ↑ Small but growing group |
| Women under 30 share of all births (2023) | — | — | ~49% — down from 70% in 1990 |
| Women over 30 share of all births (2023) | — | — | 51.4% — up from ~30% in 1990 |
Source: CDC NCHS Data Brief No. 535 (July 2025); CDC Births Provisional Data for 2025 (April 2026); Fox News/CDC data (March 2025); USAFacts citing CDC 2024
The structural shift in the age of American mothers is arguably the most important demographic story hidden inside the headline fertility numbers. In 2004, women aged 25 to 29 had the highest birth rate of any age group, at 116.5 births per 1,000. By 2024, that peak had shifted a full five-year age band upward — women aged 30 to 34 now carry the highest rate at 93.7 per 1,000. This delayed-childbearing pattern has enormous implications. Biologically, later maternal age is associated with higher rates of complications, greater use of assisted reproduction, and lower completed fertility — women who delay often end up having fewer children than originally intended. Economically, it reflects the reality that housing costs, student debt, childcare costs, and career pressures have pushed the “affordable” moment for starting a family later and later. The teen birth rate of 11.7 per 1,000 in 2025 represents a genuine public health success — unwanted teenage pregnancies have plummeted thanks to better contraception and education — but that same cohort of women in their twenties is now recording its lowest-ever birth rates too, suggesting the delay is also becoming, for many, permanent.
The age-40-plus group is the one exception to the downward trend across younger ages. Birth rates for women 40 to 44 have risen almost continuously since 1985, and today women over 40 outpace teens in total birth numbers for the first time in recorded US history. This reflects both greater biological capability (improved prenatal care, greater use of IVF and egg freezing), greater financial capacity among older mothers, and a fundamental shift in how educated American women sequence career and family. However, the gains at 40-plus are nowhere near large enough to offset the losses among women in their 20s and 30s — the maths simply does not work, and the net result remains a total fertility rate stuck near 1.6.
US Fertility Rate by Race and Ethnicity 2026
FERTILITY RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY — per 1,000 women ages 15–44 (2022–2024 avg.)
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Hispanic ████████████████████████░░░░ 64.3
Black (non-Hisp.) ████████████████████░░░░░░░░ 52.9
White (non-Hisp.) ████████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~49.8 (bridged-race est.)
Asian/Pacific Islander ██████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~42.2
AIAN ███████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~37.5
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Each █ ≈ ~2.5 births per 1,000 women in group | AIAN = American Indian/Alaska Native
| Race / Ethnicity | Fertility Rate (per 1,000 women 15–44) | Share of All US Births (2022–2024 avg.) | TFR approx. (US-born) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hispanic (any race) | 64.3 (highest of all groups) | 26.3% | ~1.81 (US-born Hispanic) |
| Black (non-Hispanic) | 52.9 | 13.6% | ~1.65 (US-born Black) |
| White (non-Hispanic) | ~49.8 (bridged-race est.) | 49.7% | ~1.75 (US-born White) |
| Asian / Pacific Islander | ~42.2 | 6.4% | ~1.53 (US-born Asian) |
| American Indian / Alaska Native | ~37.5 | 0.7% | — |
| All groups — US national GFR (2024) | 53.8 | — | ~1.599 |
Source: March of Dimes PeriStats 2022–2024 Average (retrieved May 15, 2026); Center for Immigration Studies, Fertility of Immigrants and Natives 2023 (May 2025); CDC National Vital Statistics Reports Vol. 74 No. 1 (March 2025)
The fertility rate gap between Hispanic women and all other demographic groups is the most striking feature of this table. At 64.3 births per 1,000 women, Hispanic women’s fertility rate is 22% higher than the national average of 53.8 and nearly 30% higher than the rate for White non-Hispanic women. This gap has made Hispanic women the single largest driver of US birth counts in recent years, with Hispanic births accounting for a rising share of total US births even as Hispanic women’s fertility is itself declining. Importantly, the fertility gap between immigrant Hispanic women and US-born Hispanic women is significant — US-born Hispanics have a TFR of roughly 1.81, still above most other US-born groups but well below immigrant cohorts, reflecting the rapid cultural and economic assimilation of subsequent generations.
Asian-American women record the lowest fertility rates of any major group at around 42.2 per 1,000, with a US-born TFR of approximately 1.53 — below even the already-depressed national average. This mirrors fertility trends in East Asian nations. Black non-Hispanic women’s rate of 52.9 sits close to the national average, having converged significantly from the substantially higher rates of earlier decades. One structural note worth flagging: no racial or ethnic group in the United States — among the US-born population — currently achieves replacement-level fertility. Even among US-born Hispanics at 1.81, the number falls short of the 2.1 replacement threshold. This means immigration is not merely supplementing American fertility — it is now the primary mechanism keeping total population growth from turning negative in the near term.
US Fertility Rate by State 2024
TOP 5 HIGHEST vs. BOTTOM 5 LOWEST STATE FERTILITY RATES (2024)
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HIGHEST LOWEST
S. Dakota ████████████████ 66.7 Vermont ████████ 41.6
Nebraska ███████████████░ 62.9 Rhode Isl. █████████ 45.0
Alaska ███████████████░ 60.8 N. Hamps. █████████ 45.9
N. Dakota ███████████████░ 60.3 Oregon █████████ 45.9
Texas ██████████████░░ 59.5 Maine █████████ 46.2
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Rates = births per 1,000 women ages 15–44 | Source: CDC 2024
| Rank | State | Fertility Rate (2024, per 1,000 women 15–44) | Regional Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — Highest | South Dakota | 66.7 | Great Plains |
| 2 | Nebraska | 62.9 | Great Plains |
| 3 | Alaska | 60.8 | Mountain West |
| 4 | North Dakota | 60.3 | Great Plains |
| 5 | Texas | ~59.5 | South |
| 6 | Utah | 59.9 | Mountain West |
| — | US National Average | 53.8 | — |
| 45 | Maine | ~46.2 | Northeast |
| 46 | Oregon | ~45.9 | Pacific |
| 47 | New Hampshire | 45.9 | Northeast |
| 48 | Rhode Island | 45.0 | Northeast |
| 49 — Lowest (state) | Vermont | 41.6 | Northeast |
| Lowest overall | Washington DC | 39.76 | — |
| Decline from 2004–2024 | All 50 states | Every state declined | No exceptions |
| Biggest decline (2005–2023) | Utah | –35.8% | Mountain West |
Source: CDC 2024 state-level fertility data via CNN (April 2026); USAFacts citing CDC 2024; World Population Review 2026; WorldAtlas US States by Fertility Rate
The geographic split in US fertility rates is stark and consistent: Great Plains and Mountain West states top the rankings, while Northeastern states cluster at the bottom. South Dakota’s 66.7 rate is more than 60% higher than Vermont’s 41.6 — a remarkable spread within a single country. The drivers of the high-fertility states are well understood: younger population age structures, lower housing costs, higher rates of religious participation, larger rural and agricultural communities, and significant Native American and Hispanic populations all correlate with above-average birth rates. South Dakota in particular benefits from a combination of a young demographic profile, no state income tax, and one of the highest per-capita refugee resettlement rates in the country. Nebraska and North Dakota share similar structural profiles.
The Northeast’s persistently low rates reflect the opposite set of conditions: high housing costs, high cost of living, older population profiles, high rates of graduate education among women, and urban-dominated demographics. Washington DC’s rate of 39.76 per 1,000 — the lowest in the entire country — is a direct product of its status as a highly educated, high-income, overwhelmingly urban population. Critically, every single state recorded a fertility rate decline between 2004 and 2024 — not one US state bucked the trend over that two-decade period. Even Utah, long the benchmark for high American fertility due to its large Mormon population, saw its rate fall by 35.8% between 2005 and 2023, one of the steepest declines in the nation. The demographic geography of fertility is shifting in every corner of the country, even if the magnitude differs.
US Childlessness and Delayed Childbearing Trends 2026
RISE IN CHILDLESSNESS AMONG US WOMEN (% childless, 2014 vs 2024)
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Ages 15–19 2014: 95.9% ████████████████████ 2024: 97.8% ↑
Ages 20–24 2014: 75.0% ███████████████░░░░░ 2024: 85.0% ↑↑
Ages 25–29 2014: 50.0% ██████████░░░░░░░░░░ 2024: 63.0% ↑↑
Ages 30–34 2014: 29.0% ██████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2024: 40.0% ↑↑
Ages 35–39 2014: ~24% █████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2024: ~30% ↑
Ages 40–44 2014: ~20% ████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2024: ~24% ↑
Ages 45–50 2014: 16.7% ████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2024: 14.9% ↓ (only group to fall)
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| Age Group | % Childless (2014) | % Childless (2024) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ages 15–19 | 95.9% | 97.8% | +1.9 pp |
| Ages 20–24 | 75.0% | 85.0% | +10 pp (–13% more childless) |
| Ages 25–29 | 50.0% | 63.0% | +13 pp (–27% more childless) |
| Ages 30–34 | ~29.0% | ~40.0% | +11 pp (–39% more childless) |
| Ages 35–39 | ~24.0% | ~30.0% | +6 pp (+25% more childless) |
| Ages 40–44 | ~20.0% | ~24.0% | +4 pp (+23% more childless) |
| Ages 45–50 | 16.7% | 14.9% | –1.8 pp (only group to DECLINE) |
| Women aged 20–39 who have never given birth (2024) | — | 52% (23.1 million) | +5.7M above pre-recession baseline |
| Childless women aged 40–50 (2024) | — | 3.84 million | More than 1 in 6 |
| Fewer births 2007–2024 vs expected | — | 11.8 million | “Demographic cliff” |
| % of never-want-kids among childless adults under 49 (2025) | — | 47% say they don’t plan to have children | Pew Research, 2025 |
Source: US Census Bureau, “Childlessness on the Rise” (September 2025); Carsey School of Public Policy/UNH (September 2025); Institute for Family Studies (2025); Newsweek citing UNH research (September 2025)
The childlessness data from 2024 is among the most consequential pieces of US demographic research published in recent years. The key finding: in 2024, there were 5.7 million more childless women of prime childbearing age (20–39) than prior fertility patterns would have predicted — up sharply from 2.1 million in 2016 and 4.7 million in 2022. That acceleration in just six years suggests the trend is not stabilising. The 30-to-34 age group is where the shift is most alarming from a completed-fertility standpoint: 40% of women in this group were childless in 2024, compared with just 29% a decade earlier. Women in their early 30s are in the last window where catching up is biologically feasible, and the fact that 40% of them still have no children points to a coming wave of either late first births or permanent childlessness that will define completed fertility for the millennial generation.
The 47% of childless adults under 49 who say they simply don’t want children (Pew Research, 2025) is a cultural data point as much as a demographic one. The top reasons given — not wanting children, financial concerns, desire for personal freedom, and environmental concerns — suggest that structural policy changes alone (such as childcare subsidies or baby bonuses) may have limited effectiveness. Research by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2025) found that high-income countries where men take on more household and childcare responsibilities tend to have higher fertility rates — pointing toward gender-equity-in-caregiving as a potentially more powerful lever than financial incentives alone. A 10% increase in childcare subsidies has been estimated to raise a country’s fertility by approximately 0.4%, meaningful but modest against declines of the magnitude seen in the US.
US Fertility Rate — Births by Marital Status and Education 2026
BIRTHS BY MARITAL STATUS AND EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT (2023–2024 DATA)
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Married women birth rate (2023) ████████████████████ 81.6 / 1,000
Unmarried women birth rate (2023) ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 36.4 / 1,000
% of all births — unmarried (2023) ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░ 40.0%
Childless in 40s — college grads ██████████░░░░░░░░░░ ~19–20%
Childless in 40s — no HS diploma █████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~9%
Medicaid-covered births (2024) ████████████████░░░░ ~38.5% (down 3%)
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| Category | Statistic (Latest Data) | Trend |
|---|---|---|
| Birth rate — married women (2023) | 81.6 per 1,000 married women ages 15–44 | Declining (–3% from 2022) |
| Birth rate — unmarried women (2023) | 36.4 per 1,000 unmarried women ages 15–44 | Declining (–2% from 2022) |
| % of all US births to unmarried women (2023) | 40.0% | Slight increase from 39.8% in 2022 |
| Childless women in 40s — college/grad degree | ~19–20% | High-education = more childless |
| Childless women in 40s — less than HS diploma | ~9% | Lower-education = less childless |
| Medicaid as birth payment source (2024) | ~38.5% | Down 3% from 2023; down 6% since 2016 |
| Primary C-section rate (2024) | 22.9% | Up 6% since 2019 low of 19.3% |
| Preterm birth rate (2024) | 10.41% | Essentially unchanged |
| Low birthweight rate (2022) | 8.60% | Slight rise |
| Women smoking during pregnancy (2023) | 3.0% | Continued decline |
| Prenatal care beginning first trimester (2023) | 76.1% | Declined from 77.0% in 2022 |
Source: CDC National Vital Statistics Reports Vol. 74 No. 1 (March 2025); CDC NCHS Data Brief No. 535 (July 2025); CDC Blog NCHS (July 2025)
The education-and-childlessness inversion is one of the most discussed paradoxes in American demography. Women with college and graduate degrees are twice as likely to be childless in their 40s as women without a high school diploma — roughly 19–20% versus 9%. This pattern has inverted the historical norm: for most of the 20th century, less-educated women had more children and college-educated women had fewer. But the inversion is now sharp enough that 64% of childless women in their 40s are White, while the majority of never-married women in their 40s are Black or Hispanic — two entirely different demographic and economic routes to childlessness with very different policy implications. The Medicaid coverage decline to ~38.5% of births reflects a combination of rising incomes among younger families (pre-birth) and policy changes, though the absolute number remains high, underscoring the role of public health systems in supporting American births.
The rising C-section rate (up 6% since 2019) and the 10.41% preterm birth rate are public health metrics that track directly with fertility trends: older mothers, who now account for a growing share of all births, face statistically higher risks of complications, preterm delivery, and caesarean delivery. These are not alarming figures in isolation, but they reflect the medical reality of an ageing maternal population and underscore the healthcare system costs that accompany delayed childbearing at scale.
US Fertility Rate vs Global Comparison 2026
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE — US VS SELECTED COUNTRIES (~2023–2025)
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Niger (Africa) ████████████████████████████████ 6.8+
Global average ████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.2 (2023)
Replacement level ██████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.1
US 2007 (peak) ██████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 2.12
France ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.68
US 2025 ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ~1.60
N. America avg. ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.6
UK ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.49
Europe avg. ███████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.4
Germany ███████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.36
Italy ██████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 1.20
South Korea ████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ 0.72
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
| Country / Region | Total Fertility Rate (~2023–2025) | Below Replacement? |
|---|---|---|
| Global average | 2.2 (2023, UN) | No (marginally above) |
| Africa (average) | ~4.0 | No |
| Latin America & Caribbean | ~1.8 | Yes (below 2.1 since 2014) |
| France | ~1.68 | Yes |
| United States (2025) | ~1.60 | Yes |
| Northern America (UN region) | 1.6 | Yes |
| United Kingdom | ~1.49 | Yes |
| Europe (average) | ~1.4 | Yes |
| Germany | ~1.36 | Yes |
| Japan | ~1.20 | Yes |
| Italy | ~1.20 | Yes |
| China | ~1.0 | Yes |
| South Korea | ~0.72 | Yes (record global low) |
| US below replacement since | Early 1970s (sustained) | Yes |
Source: Pew Research Center, “5 Facts About Global Fertility Trends” (August 2025); Congressional Budget Office Demographic Outlook 2025–2055; Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (January 2026)
Placed in global context, the United States fertility rate of ~1.60 is consistent with other wealthy, developed nations but represents a meaningful departure from the US’s historical exceptionalism on this metric. For much of the post-WWII era, America maintained notably higher fertility than Western Europe or Japan, sustained by a combination of immigration, religious observance, cultural pronatalism, and a relatively younger population age structure. That advantage has now largely evaporated. The US sits at the same 1.6 level as the broader Northern America average and is tracking toward the European average of 1.4. The trajectory is clear: as the Pew Research Center noted in August 2025, fertility rates in Northern America are expected to remain roughly stable through 2100 — neither recovering to replacement nor collapsing to East Asian lows.
The global outlier in the other direction is South Korea at 0.72 — so far below replacement that demographers describe it as “ultra-low fertility” and have modelled scenarios involving meaningful population halving within generations. That extreme is not the US trajectory, but it serves as a warning of where prolonged below-replacement fertility combined with low immigration leads. The US’s one structural defence against the worst demographic outcomes remains immigration, which contributes meaningfully to both birth counts and working-age population growth. However, as 2025 provisional data reflects, the Trump administration’s sharply reduced net migration has already begun compressing overall US population growth from above 1% in 2023–24 to approximately 0.3% in 2025 — a dramatic single-year compression that reinforces rather than offsets the fertility trend.
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